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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: 'The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"2 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Although Appellant has listed what it terms to be the issues presented for review, the 
issues before the Court are more aptly stated as: 
1. Whether the lower Court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's Motion 
to Disqualify Mr. Denver C. Snuffer and the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, 
P.C. when it was found that even if Mr. Snuffer were found to be a necessary witness, that 
Plaintiff's hardship in replacing him was much greater than Defendant's in allowing Mr. 
Snuffer to continue as counsel. 
2. Whether the lower Court abused its discretion in finding the Defendant's 
Motion to Disqualify was filed in an untimely manner. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court for correctness. 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial 
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11, 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
'Trial courts are usually given broad discretion in controlling the conduct of attorneys 
in matters before the court[.]" Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). Relying upon the finding of this Court in Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 
962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998), Westbrook asserts that the trial court's discretion should be limited 
because of the special interest this Court has in administering the law governing attorney 
ethical rules. However, this Court has also found that "[w]here courts are called upon to 
resolve numerous factual disputes, and the quantity of less-tangible factors implicating the 
trial court's decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better position to consider and 
weigh all those circumstances in their application to the legal standard at issue." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Further, this Court has found that trial courts 
enjoy a greater degrefe ot discretion when it is necessary to resolve factual disputes, since 
such a tribunal "is naturally in a better position to consider and weigh all th[e] circumstances 
in their application to the legal standard at issue." Houghton, 962 P.2d at 61. Therefore the 
correct standard to apply is an abuse of discretion standard. 
2 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. That rules states: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in 
the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the 
client. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
Westbrook petitioned this Court to review the decision of Judge Davis in a case that 
has been litigated for more than three years. The decision of Judge Davis was to deny 
Westbrook's request that DJI's counsel, Mr. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. be disqualified as 
counsel although they allege he is a "necessary witness." As explained by Judge Davis, not 
only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, even if he were, each of the exceptions in Rule 
3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility apply in this case. (R. 2446-54). 
DJI initiated this action in May of 2001. (R. 2453). After almost three years of 
litigating this matter, and on the very eve of entering into the trial phase, Westbrook 
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submitted a tactical motion to disqualify DJI's counsel. That move was not meant to 
advance adjudication of this matter, rather it was meant only as an attempt to delay that 
process, an approach that Westbrook has continually employed throughout this matter. This 
petition for interlocutory appeal is no different. All of the tactical delay is meant to 
capitalize upon the duration of time they, as developers, can keep Plaintiffs property from 
being developed through this litigation. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
On November 16,2000, the parties entered into an agreement. See R. 2453. On May 
7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of that agreement and began this litigation. Id., 
see also R. 1-162. After considerable discovery, on December 20,2002, D.J. filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 948-1058. On January 28, 2003, Westbrook filed 
its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 56(f) 
continuance. Id., see also R. 1082-1153. The Court granted them additional months of 
discovery before they were required to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgement. 
After additional months of discovery, on August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1376-1676. On 
August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see also R. 1693-1926. On August 27, 2003, 
the lower Court heard arguments on D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id., see 
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also R.1927. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the 
parties' agreement. R. 2452, 1996-2001. 
Months later, Westbrook moved to disqualify Mr. Snuffer. R. 2452. That motion 
was denied by the lower Court. R. 2446-54. Westbrook sought an interlocutory appeal of 
that denial. R. 2484. The Appeals Court granted Certiorari and this appeal ensued. 
Facts established in the Record below: 
In Westbrook's prior motion, and in their current petition, Westbrook relies upon 
deposition testimony of Dave Mast, Robert Christiansen, and Jeff Anderson as support for 
their allegation that Mr. Snuffer is or will become a necessary witness in this matter. As was 
shown in the record below, the testimony used by Westbrook is taken out of context and 
extrapolated to create a contrived support for their motion and for this current appeal. 
First, Westbrook claims that the record shows Mr. Snuffer was "heavily involved" 
in the negotiations. (SeeWestbrook'sBrief on Appeal, p. 10-12). This is not true. Mr. Mast 
stated in his deposition that he, Mr. Snuffer, and Bob Christiansen were involved in 
negotiating the contract, but qualified that statement by saying that Mr. Snuffer "wasn't 
participating in the entire negotiations" and that he "did not author the settlement agreement 
language." See Deposition of David Mast, p. 76, In. 1-8, attached as Exhibit 2(B) to 
Westbrook's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. 
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Further, Westbrook cites the deposition of Robert Christiansen during which Mr. 
Christiansen states that Mr. Snuffer was involved on "our side." He does not however at any 
point state that Mr. Snuffer negotiated nor authored any portion of the agreement. 
Westbrook states that it is Mr. Christiansen's testimony that Mr. Snuffer "collaborated" with 
Bruce R. Baird and Michael F. Jones on drafts of the settlement agreement. This was not 
what Mr. Christiansen's testimony said. In fact, those are the words of the Defendant's 
attorney taking the deposition. See Deposition of Robert Christiansen, p. 25-26, attached 
as Exhibit 2(C) to Westbrook's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. To 
be fair, Mr. Christiansen did say that Mr. Snuffer was involved, but he further qualified that 
response by testifying that Mr. Snuffer was not at all involved in the drafting and 
negotiating that occurred in Phoenix where the final agreement was actually reached. Id. 
Mr. Christiansen's testimony refers to conversations and email exchanges between Mr. 
Snuffer and his clients. Id. The allegations set forth by Westbrook are completely without 
basis or foundation. 
Westbrook alleges that the agreement which requires the essential determination of 
the Court, was drafted in an "all night negotiating session." (See Westbrook's Brief, p. 10). 
This again is not true. DJI does not deny that there was at least one occasion in which the 
parties met to negotiate the terms of the agreement. (R. 2273-5). And, Mr. Snuffer did 
attend one of those sessions in his office. Id. However, Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who were 
also in attendance, dikring that session, never let Mr. Snuffer exercise any physical control 
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over the draft document. Id. In fact, Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones maintained the document on 
their disk and completed all the typing. Any language proposed by Mr. Mast was rewritten 
and reworded by Mr. Baird and/or Mr. Jones into language they agreed upon. Id. 
Furthermore, the agreement was substantially completed before that session by Westbrook's 
attorneys, and fully and finally completed in a three day negotiating session in Phoenix, 
Arizona, when Mr. Snuffer was NOT in attendance. Id. 
In fact, the final agreement was put together in Phoenix, with Bruce Baird, David 
Mast and Robert Christiansen over the course of three day's worth of meetings. See R. 
2413. Westbrook contends that there were only minor changes, but that is not true. The 
majority of the agreement was negotiated at that time. See R. 2273-5. Mr. Snuffer was in 
Salt Lake City at the time, and did not participate in the creation of the final documents, nor 
in the final execution of the agreement. Id. The final executed documents were not even 
shown to Mr. Snuffer until April of the year following, six months later. Id., see also R. 
2262-13; see also R. 2223-214. It should be noted that ALL of the closing documents' 
notary attestations are from Phoenix, where the closing took place. Id. Although Mr. Mast 
and Mr. Christiansen were in Phoenix (along with Mr. Baird and Mr. Grampp of 
3
 Which is a copy of the cover letter and attachments sent in April, 2001, in which 
Mr. Snuffer finally received a copy of the final documents from DAE/Westbrook. 
4
 Which is a copy of another delivery of the Special Warranty Deed signed at 
closing, also sent in April, 2001 to Mr. Snuffer from Terrabrook. 
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DAE/Westbrook), Mr. Snuffer was not in Phoenix and did not attend the closing. R. 2220-
18. 
It is Mr. Snuffer's testimony that the only involvement he had with any of the 
negotiations or drafting of the agreement was mere "word smithing." Id. The actual terms 
of the agreement were all negotiated and determined by Plaintiffs President, Mr. Mast, and 
Vice-President, Mr. Christiansen, the parties who actually had authority to agree to that 
settlement. Id. Mr. Snuffer's testimony will not be helpful in this matter, and will run afoul 
of attorney-client privilege. Id. 
Westbrook relies upon testimony of Jeff Anderson for the assertion that Mr. Snuffer 
discussed the Micron easements with him. The testimony of Jeff Anderson was that he 
discussed that issue with Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer. See Exhibit 2(D) of Westbrook's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, Deposition of Jeff Anderson, p. 35. 
It never states that only Mr. Snuffer discussed that matter with Mr. Anderson, in fact, when 
Defendant's counsel questioned as to what Mr. Snuffer specifically discussed with him, Mr. 
Anderson's answer referred to "they" or Mr. Mast and Mr. Snuffer, not Mr. Snuffer in 
particular. Id. Mr. Mast was always the principle in any such conversation. Further, Mr. 
Snuffer has no recollection of any such conversation. Therefore, his testimony will be he 
can't recall any such discussion. Testimony of that nature does not require him to be called 
as a "necessary witness" in this proceeding and is certainly no basis for disqualifying him. 
8 
Defendant claims that because there was communication both before and after the 
settlement agreement between Mr. Snuffer and other attorneys or other parties which also 
makes him a witness. (See Appellant Brief, p. 13). The letters referred to as evidence of 
that, however, do not even reference the alignment of the road which is at issue in this 
matter. See R. 2213, R. 2157-45. The subject matter of both of those letters is regarding 
a totally separate and different road. Id. Furthermore, even a quick review demonstrates 
that Mr. Snuffer wrote those letters on behalf of his client. Id. Furthermore, they are 
included within the protection afforded by Rule 408 of the Rules of Evidence. They in no 
way require that Mr. Snuffer be a necessary witness. 
Lastly, Defendant's argue that because Mr. Snuffer was "carbon copied" or sent 
duplicates of letters that were sent to other people, that he should be a witness. (See 
Appellant Brief, p. 12-13). The rules of evidence prohibit him from acting as a witness with 
regard to the subject matter of those letters. He did not write them, in fact he was not even 
the person being addressed by those letters. This does not make him a necessary witness. 
The exhibits of the Defendant also belie their claims. For example, the letter to the 
Draper City attorney attached as Exhibit 2(E) to Westbrook's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order, supports the non-disqualification of Mr. Snuffer. The letter 
shows no involvement of Mr. Snuffer between November 7th and November 29th, 2000. Id. 
The letter doesn't refer to Phoenix because Mr. Snuffer never went to Phoenix. R. 2220-18, 
see also R. 2262-1; see also R. 2223-21. The Agreement was signed in Phoenix on 
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November 16th, without Mr. Snuffer being present. Id. That same Exhibit shows that Mr. 
Snuffer is not a necessary witness to any event. All events about which the letter speaks had 
multiple witnesses present, and never did Mr. Snuffer alone accomplish anything to which 
he alone could testifyL 
Westbrook' s recitation of the facts attempts to exaggerate the importance of a meeting 
held in Mr. Snuffer's office one evening with Mr. Christiansen and the drafters of the 
agreement. (See Appellant Brief p.9-11). At the same time, they attempt to depreciate the 
four-day negotiation that took place in Phoenix, Arizona, at which Mr. Snuffer was not in 
attendance. (See Appellant Brief, p. 12-14). Mr. Mast, Mr. Grampp (DAEAVestbrook) and 
Mr. Baird (counsel for DAEAVestbrook) began to meet in Phoenix on Monday, November 
13th. (R. 2412, 2398). Mr. Christiansen joined them on Wednesday, November 15th. The 
contract closed on November 17th. R. 2220-18, see also R. 2262-1; see also R. 2223-21. 
On November 17th Mr. Snuffer was not only not in Phoenix on the 17th, but he was in Salt 
Lake City participating in Panel C of the Utah Ethics Committee Panels to screen alleged 
ethical violations by members of the Utah Bar. R. 2220-18. Mr. Snuffer has been appointed 
by the Utah Supreme Court to sit in matters involving allegations of ethical rules violations 
involving members of the Utah State Bar. Id. This date in 2000 was one of the occasions 
in which a hearing was conducted, which required Mr. Snuffer to be in Salt Lake City. Id. 
Monday and Tuesday of that week, Mr. Snuffer had appointments in his office, and the day 
before the closing on Wednesday the 16th, Mr. Snuffer was in Court. Id. Therefore 
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throughout the time when the final negotiations were taking place, Mr. Snuffer was occupied 
with other matters involving other responsibilities and clients. Mr. Snuffer should not be 
found to be a necessary witness in a case where he was not even in attendance at the most 
crucial and determinate parts of the finalization of the agreement at issue. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Over the course of three years in which this case has been litigated, Mr. Denver C. 
Snuffer, Jr. has acted as Appellee's counsel. Throughout that time, Appellants have filed 
motion after motion in an obvious attempt to delay resolution of the matter. Each of the 
parties are developers. Appellant has already begun and is successfully developing the 
property it owns. Although Appellant agreed to provide a road which would allow Appellee 
to develop its property, it has refused to do so. Hence, the instant litigation. The more time 
the issue remains in litigation and unresolved, the longer Appellee cannot develop its 
property and compete with Appellants. The purpose for many of the motions filed in the 
lower court is to delay resolution. This appeal is no different. 
m c m a i UUUIL u o i i c u u y i u u n u mat / ^ p p c n c c ^ uuun^ci MIUUIU n u i uc uio^uaiiiiCu. 
pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. That rule only requires 
disqualification if the counsel is found to be a necessary witness and none of the exceptions 
listed in the rule applies. Not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, but each of the 
exceptions listed applies. 
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Appellants argue that Mr. Snuffer's testimony is needed with regard to his experience 
with the negotiation and drafting of a settlement agreement between the parties. Mr. Snuffer 
never participated in negotiation of the settlement agreement without a representative of 
Appellee present and directing that negotiation. He had no control over the terms or tactics 
used in negotiating that agreement. Neither did he exercise any significant amount of 
control over the drafting of the agreement. The greatest portion of the agreement was 
drafted by Appellant's former counsel, and then finalized over the course of a three day 
negotiation session in Phoenix, Arizona, where Mr. Snuffer was not present. Mr. Snuffer's 
only contribution to the drafting was in the effect of "word-smithing." At all times, Mr. 
Snuffer was accompanied by Appellee or representatives of the Appellee. Any testimony 
he could offer, outside of the protections of attorney client privilege, would be merely 
duplicative of what another witness might offer. He simply is not a necessary witness. 
Furthermore, the lower court correctly found that even if he were found to be a 
necessary witness, he should not be disqualified because of the exceptions contained in the 
rule. Focusing mainly on the substantial hardship Appellee would be forced to suffer should 
Mr. Snuffer be disqualified, the lower court correctly balanced the hardships of each party 
and correctly determiped that Plaintiff's hardship would be significantly greater. Just the 
pleadings in this case fill more than eight file folders at the lower court. It would take 
hundreds of hours for an experienced trial attorney to become familiar with just the facts in 
the pleadings, let alone the boxes of information each party maintains. That is already 
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known and usable for Mr. Snuffer. It would be prejudicial and unfair for Mr. Snuffer to be 
disqualified more than three years after this case began. The lower court is allowed a 
significant amount of discretion in cases of this type. It knows the facts, is familiar with the 
parties, and should be allowed to make decisions of this nature. To reverse its decision 
makes this Court a fact finder and not an appeals court. 
The lower court also correctly applied the standards set forth in Zion ys First National 
Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah 1989). The court in that case 
held that a motion, such as the one brought by Appellants, to disqualify, should be brought 
at the earliest moment so as not to disadvantage the opposing party or be used as a trial 
tactic. In that case, three months was long enough to make the motion improper. The lower 
court found that the issues, for which Appellant now argues it requires Mr. Snuffer's 
testimony, were known for probably more than three years, and at the very least, six months. 
It was appropriate to deny Appellant's motion to disqualify and it is appropriate to deny their 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
In DJI's Opposition to DAE/Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify, DJI argued that 
"[w]henever an opposing party attempts to disqualify the attorney for the party adverse to 
him, the Court's sensitivity to a tactical ploy should be raised." See Exhibit 5, p. 6 to 
Westbrook's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. The same holds true for 
this instance. The Rules of Professional Conduct are not intended to be used as advocacy 
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tools in litigation. They are intended to govern an attorney's professional conduct. The 
Rules of Professional Conduct caution us in this regard and provide the following statement 
in the Preamble to the Rules: 
"The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as 
procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-
assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a 
disciplinary authority does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral 
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of that Rule. 
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should be deemed to augment any 
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of 
violating such a duty." 
(Emphasis added.) Westbrook used this procedural/tactical "weapon" in the lower court and 
now attempts to use it in this Court. It is improper and disqualification should not be 
granted in this case. 
It is also important to recognize the standard of review this Court should apply. As 
stated above, this Court has found that "[w]here courts are called upon to resolve numerous 
factual disputes, and the quantity of less-tangible factors implicating the trial court's decision 
is large, a trial court is naturally in a better position to consider and weigh all those 
circumstances in their application to the legal standard at issue." State v. Penay 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Further, this Court has found that trial courts enjoy a greater 
degree of discretion wnen it is necessary to resolve factual disputes, since such a tribunal "is 
naturally in a better position to consider and weigh all th[e] circumstances in their 
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application to the legal standard at issue." Houghton, 962 P.2d at 61. The decision of the 
trial court was based not just upon the law, nor just upon the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
rather it was largely based upon the factual circumstances surrounding the instant litigation. 
Judge Davis is the third judge to be involved in this extended litigation. He has however, 
been involved long enough (for two years) to determine that tc[a]ll things considered, the 
parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed, the Court file now fills seven 
exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal issues. The Clerk of the 
court has just opened the eighth file." See Memorandum Decision, p. 6. These issues and 
the factual circumstances surrounding those issues have been presented and weighed by 
Judge Davis in making his decision. That is very evident from the trial court's memorandum 
and decision. Because of the complexity of the issues and the large amount of facts that 
have been incorporated into making this decision, a large amount of discretion should be 
afforded the trial court. 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Found that Mr. Snuffer Should Not be 
Disqualified Pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility. 
Defendant argues that Mr. Snuffer and his law firm should be disqualified to act as 
counsel for the Plaintiff in this matter. As support for that assertion, Defendant relies upon 
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which states: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
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(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial 
hardship on the client. (Emphasis added.) 
Not only is Mr. Snuffer not a necessary witness, nor likely to act as a witness in this matter, 
each one of the exceptions in this rule would apply to Mr. Snuffer and any potential 
testimony he might possibly give. 
"In determining whether to disqualify counsel, the trial court must recognize a 
presumption in favor of [a party's] counsel of choice." Wheat v. United States ,486U.S. 153, 
164 (1988). Furthermore, adverse counsel should not be called as a witness to offer 
insignificant testimony or as a ruse to disqualify counsel. See, e.g., State v. Worthen, 765 
P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988). The drafters of the ABA Code, upon which the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct were modeled, have cautioned that the ethical rules "[were] not 
designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him 
as counsel." ABA Code, Canon 5, n. 31; accord Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 766 
(3d Cir. 1975). "The cost and inconvenience to clients and the judicial system from misuse 
of the rules for tactical purposes is significant." See Brown & Brown, Disqualification of 
theTestifyingAdvocate—A Firm Rule? 51 ^.C.h.Rev. 595,619-21 (1919) 
potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected to "particularly strict 
judicial scrutiny." Optyl Eyewear Fashion v. Style Companies, 760 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 
1985) (citing Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Freeman 
v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co.} 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
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Defendant's entire purpose for this motion is not legitimate. Rather, it is meant for 
tactical purposes, and meant to prejudice the Plaintiff in terms of time, expense, and 
frustration. Where the party seeking disqualification is also the one wanting to call the 
attorney as a witness, the court "must be especially sensitive to the potential for abuse." 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Frazier, 637 F. Supp. 77, 86 (D.Kan. 1986). Defendant's 
motion is not appropriate, is meant only to abuse the system, and should be denied. 
Furthermore, the lower court correctly found that even if Mr. Snuffer were found to be a 
"necessary" witness, that the exceptions applicable in Rule 3.7 apply. This Court should 
find the same thing in this appeal. 
A. Mr. Snuffer Is Not a Necessary Witness for this Matter. 
There is not one piece of evidence nor one word of testimony that Mr. Snuffer could 
give that would not be cumulative of the testimony that would be offered by either Mr. Mast 
or Mr. Christiansen or some other witness. In every instance in which there was an oral 
communication between any party with regard to the settlement agreement, Mr. Snuffer was 
always accompanied by Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen. Further, in all communications he 
was acting in conformity with instructions of Mr. Mast or Mr. Christiansen, who directed 
all negotiations and who reached all agreements. Mr. Snuffer did nothing independent of 
his role as an attorney for Mr. Mast's company. In all of those instances, Mr. Snuffer never 
acted as a principle, nor negotiated any portion of the settlement agreement. Throughout 
those negotiations, he acted as an advisor to his client making all of his communications 
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with them protected by the attorney client privilege and inadmissible as evidence. His ability 
to testify being limited by the rules of privilege not only excludes him from acting as a 
witness in this matter |3ut also eliminates the basis for this appeal. 
A lawyer is a "necessary" witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material and 
unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 
(D.Colo. 1994). Defendant alleges that the decision in World Youth should apply to this 
matter, because "Snuffer's involvement in the underlying events here is purportedly almost 
identical to the disqualified lawyers' involvement" in that case and Acme Analgesics, Ltd. 
v. Lemmon Co., 602 F.Supp. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Once again, however Defendant 
stretches the truth. In both of those cases, the lawyer who was ultimately disqualified, was 
the sole negotiator, executor, and administrator of the contract, which made him the key 
witness in both situations. See World Youth at 1302 and Acme Anaglesics at 306. Mr. 
Snuffer was not the sole negotiator, in fact as Mr. Mast testified in his deposition, his role 
was relatively small in any negotiations. See Depo of Mr. Mast at p. 76. Mr. Snuffer did 
not draft the document, that was accomplished by Bruce Baird and Michael F. Jones. Mr. 
Snuffer has not administered any portion of the agreement, in fact there was little time to 
administer the agreement as Defendants almost immediately breached that agreement. In 
fact, Mr. Snuffer not only did not administer the agreement, he didn't see the final signed 
agreement for over six months after it was finalized. Mr. Snuffer simply was not as involved 
as Defendants claim he was. To observe the negotiations and even review drafts of the 
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agreement does not require him a necessary witness. American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. 
Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Similarly, a lawyer who 
merely observed the negotiations and reviewed draft agreements need not be disqualified."). 
See also Paretti v. Cavalier Label Co.} Inc., 722 F. Supp. 985, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (The 
court found in Paretti that the attorney was not a necessary witness as his recollection of the 
meeting did not conflict with that of movant's corporate counsel; as his involvement in 
drawing up early drafts of agreements was not important because the agreements were 
redrafted; as it was not shown that any of the key terms were actually written by that attorney 
and, therefore, reflect his understanding of the transaction; and as to any ambiguous terms 
the testimony of the parties concerning their intent was the best evidence). 
Moreover, any testimony Mr. Snuffer could offer is obtainable from various other 
sources including Mr. Mast, Mr. Christiansen, Mr. Baird, Mr. Jones, Mr. Anderson, Mr. 
Grampp, and a variety of other persons who were directly involved in the creation of the 
settlement agreement, and even more specifically, the very paragraph 14 that has become 
central to this litigation. Most of these other individuals were in attendance at the three day 
meeting in Phoenix where the terms of the agreement were actually finalized and agreed 
upon. Mr. Snuffer was not at that final meeting. The fact that he communicated to his client 
by phone, email, or even fax, does not make him a witness. "[I]f the evidence sought to be 
elicited from the attorney-witness can be produced in some other effective way, it may be 
that the attorney is not necessary as a witness." Humphrey on behalf of State v. McLaren, 
19 
402N.W.2d535,541 (Minn. 1987). "If the lawyer's testimony is merely cumulative, or quite 
peripheral. . . ordinarily the lawyer is not a necessary witness." Id. "Simply to assert that 
the attorney will be called as a witness, a too-frequent trial tactic, is not enough." Id. 
In the cited testimony of Mr. Christiansen (on page 34 of the attached deposition 
transcript) Mr. Christiansen declined to make Mr. Snuffer a party to that paragraph 14 
discussion. He testified that it was he (Mr. Christiansen) who satisfied himself, through 
discussions with Mr. Baird representing DAE/Westbrook that paragraph 14 granted access 
to the Alpine Highway. He testified that this understanding was "critical" to bringing the 
property into development. Nothing is said about Mr. Snuffer's involvement with that 
discussion. 
B. Mr. Snuffer's Testimony Relates to an Uncontested Issue. 
Defendant alleges that Mr. Snuffer could testify as to the meaning and significance 
behind the terms of the settlement agreement, because Mr. Snuffer at times was in 
attendance at meetings where negotiation occurred between the parties. The fact of the 
matter is, however, that Mr. Snuffer was not in attendance at the meetings where the 
agreement and its terms were actually reduced to final form. That meeting was one which 
lasted three days and occurred in Phoenix. Mr. Snuffer could testify that there is an actual 
agreement, but not much more because of his non-involvement at that final meeting. This 
is an uncontested issue, and the testimony is not necessary. 
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The relationship between paragraph 14 and the road connecting the Plaintiffs 
property to the Alpine Highway is not disputed, however. Mr. Grampp, of DAE/Westbrook, 
who signed the agreement knew what was being agreed upon in the language of the 
agreement. As he wrote, "everyone had always contemplated that this road would be 
constructed running from about the middle of SunCrest's southern boundary southwesterly 
across the northwest corner of Micron's property then turning south to connect with U-92 
on the western boundary of Micron's property." (See Exhibit 4, attached hereto.) This 
understanding which "everyone had always contemplated" is that Plaintiff's property 
(located along the western edge of Micron's property) would necessarily have access 
through this alignment to U-92. You can't build a road on this alignment and not give 
Plaintiff access to the Alpine Highway (U-92). Therefore, the matter upon which they seek 
Mr. Snuffer's testimony is not in controversy. As DAEAVestbrook's representative has 
written: "Everyone always contemplated" the alignment next to Plaintiffs property. 
C. Mr. Snuffer's Testimony Relates to the Nature and Value of Legal 
Services Rendered in the Case. 
The only testimony Mr. Snuffer could give would relate to the nature of the legal 
services he rendered to Plaintiff in offering counsel during the negotiations of the settlement 
agreement. As counsel for Plaintiff both before and during the settlement agreement, Mr. 
Snuffer was consulted by Mr. Mast for his company's interests. He discussed the terms with 
his client, in confidence, and without any representative of Defendant's being present. He 
did not however, act as a principle negotiator. Mr. Snuffer was never authorized to do that. 
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Mr. Christiansen testified that Mr. Snuffer attended various meetings before the agreement, 
but this does not make him a necessary witness. The only questions that Mr. Snuffer could 
answer without violating privilege would be confined to what the nature of the services that 
he actually did provide. His understanding of the terms of the agreement is irrelevant and 
privilege protected, therefore, this exception under Rule 3.7 also applies and prevents him 
from being disqualified. 
D. Disqualification of Mr. Snuffer and His Law Firm Would Work a 
Substantial Hardship on the Plaintiff. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the disqualification of Mr. Snuffer and Nelson, 
Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. would work a very substantial hardship on the Plaintiff. The 
complaint in this case was filed in May of 2001, over three years ago. Throughout that time 
discovery has taken place. The depositions of all the key witnesses to this agreement have 
taken place, all of which were taken before Defendant's 56(f) motion. Written discovery 
has been sent out and answered by both parties. Discovery concluded on September 12, 
2003. Plaintiff has sent out it's trial interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents. Plaintiff is very close to certifying this matter as ready for trial. It is much later 
in the game than Defendant alleges. But yet, Defendant did not make any effort to bring this 
motion until this stage. The depositions relied upon by Defendant as support for this motion 
were all taken in July of last year, many months ago. Although not appropriate then either, 
it would have been at least more timely to have brought this motion when that testimony was 
first available to them. To disqualify Mr. Snuffer at this point requires the hiring of new 
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counsel. Even an expert trial attorney would require hundreds of hours to be brought up to 
speed with the facts surrounding this matter. There are now more than 8 full files of just 
pleadings and their associated exhibits maintained at the lower Court. The cost of hiring 
such new counsel would be exorbitant. It is unlikely that a full transfer of knowledge could 
ever be accomplished. Plaintiff's right to have the counsel of their choice, with the relevant 
background information in his command outweighs any claim of Defendant to having Mr. 
Snuffer as a witness. Defendant's claim that Plaintiff can afford that is beyond the point, 
it is unfair, inequitable, and a trial tactic that is meant only to delay a meaningful conclusion 
to this matter. In effect they are saying they want permission to spend a lot of Mr. Mast's 
money, and hopefully too, to compromise his chances in this litigation. No litigant can 
afford that. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, neither would Westbrook be prejudiced if Mr. 
Snuffer were not disqualified. There are many other witnesses to the negotiations, drafting, 
and administration of the settlement agreement, all of whom Defendant could examine at 
trial. The limited amount of involvement Mr. Snuffer had would not add to the testimony 
of those witnesses, in fact, the majority of that small amount of testimony would be 
protected by privilege. Defendants are well aware of this. The purpose of this appeal is not 
to obtain Mr. Snuffer's testimony, but rather to delay this case. In balancing the extreme 
hardship that would be placed upon Plaintiff should Mr. Snuffer be disqualified with the 
23 
non-existent hardship Defendant would have to bear, there simply appears to be no valid 
rational for disqualifying Mr. Snuffer this late in the process. 
In that connection, this case has been assigned to three different Judges since it was 
filed years ago. It has had at least five different defense attorneys working on it. There has 
been one constant throughout the many changes in the case, and the one constant is Mr. 
Snuffer. His memory of the proceedings in this case simply cannot be replicated. The 
Plaintiff has paid to have that continuity, and should be able to retain it. It should not be 
taken away by Defendant through a tactical ploy. 
It was two years ago in May of this year that the current Judge told the Defendants 
that they had 90 days to "get going" on this case and do some discovery. They failed to 
respond within 90 days to the pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. Despite this 
failing, and over Plaintiff's objection to the untimely filing of a response, the Court allowed 
their untimely response and considered it in making its ruling. Defendants, too have resisted 
discovery and obstructed progress in this case. From Mr. Baird's refusal to provide 
information when he avoided service of a subpoena (he got 9 days instead of 10) to the latest 
refusal to provide information subpoenaed because of claims that they are "privileged" 
(although they seek information sent to Third Parties), the Defendants have consistently 
obstructed progress in this case. 
When this litigation commenced, the Defendant's attorney Mr. Baird threatened Mr. 
Mast that the Defendant was going to "teach him a lesson." They intended to cost him 
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money, delay the case and to "make him bleed" in the process of handling this litigation. 
They have conducted this case consistent with this goal. That is, they have thrown up 
obstacles from the start. This latest maneuver is in keeping with that pattern. It should be 
denied. 
E. Defendant's Hypocrisy. 
Defendant talks out of both sides of its mouth. When Bruce Baird was subpoenaed, 
the information sought was resisted because it was an "attorney client privilege" and could 
not be discovered. Bruce Baird, it will be recalled, was DAE/Westbrook's attorney who 
went to Phoenix and actually authored the agreement between the parties. He was directly 
and thoroughly involved in the process and met with Mr. Mast in Phoenix as 
DAE/Westbrook's agent. If anyone fits the arguments being advanced here, it is Mr. Baird. 
However, when discovery from him was sought, it was resisted as being offensive to the 
"attorney-client privilege" and no discovery has been forthcoming. 
Now a transformation has occurred. Now, Mr. Baird along with his partner Mr. Jones 
"realized the conflict that would arise if they represented Westbrook in litigation involving 
matters in which they had substantially participated and in which they were likely to 
testify."(See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Denver C. 
Snuffer, Jr. And Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, page 3, footnote 1.) So, we have Mr. 
Baird changing from being unable to testify and cloaked by privilege on the one hand, into 
an expectant and eager witness on the other hand. Even since that flip flop, Westbrook has 
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now asserted that any documents he might have control over are not his, but rather are theirs. 
Therefore he could not turn over any documents in his possession because they are not his, 
and the attorney client privilege prevents him from offering any testimony. Such gymnastics 
are not merely "argument" but are dishonest and hypocritical. The truth is being subverted 
in the quest to manipulate results. 
II. It was not an Abuse of Discretion to Determine that Mr. Snuffer Was Not 
a Necessary Witness. 
Westbrook alleges in their memorandum that Judge Davis refused to make a 
determination of whether Mr. Snuffer was a necessary witness, and therefore his denial of 
their motion to disqualify was in error. That however, was not the finding of the lower 
court. In fact, Judge Davis did not refuse to make such a finding, but instead found that the 
exceptions available to a "necessary" witness were valid enough that it would not matter if 
Mr. Snuffer even were found to be such. 
The memorandum clearly states: "While Snuffer's involvement may have rendered 
him a 'necessary' witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to reach 
such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the 'special 
circumstances' exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct." See Memorandum Decision, p. 5. The lower court's determination is very clear. 
Now, Westbrook wishes to convolute the clarity by claiming that it could not reach a 
conclusion of fitness of the exception without a finding that Mr. Snuffer was a "necessary" 
witness. If Snuffer was not a necessary witness, would there be a need for an exception? 
26 
If that were the case Westbrook's motion should also have been denied, they would have 
lost all basis for the motion. 
The finding of the lower court implies that Snuffer may be a necessary witness and 
then goes forward to explain why the exception applies. This was not error as suggested by 
Westbrook. There is nothing to be gained by delving further into such a determination as 
the finding of necessary witness would certainly have been immediately nullified by the 
compelling circumstances for the exception. This is exactly what happened. Westbrook's 
is a circular argument that has no merit. 
III. Judge Davis' Application of Jensen to this Case Was Correct. 
Westbrook attempts to make hay of the lower court's application of Zion's First 
National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah 1989). In Jensen, the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately 
filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for 
disqualification." This is the standard that the trial court relied upon. In Jensen, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel to be untimely because it was 
filed "more than three months" after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. Id. at 
481. Although the lower court likened that finding to the circumstances surrounding the 
decision to accept parole evidence three months prior to Westbrook's filing of their Motion 
to Disqualify, the three month period was not the determining issue. 
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Rather, the trial court stated that it "must examine the entire procedural history to 
determine timeliness." See Memorandum p. 7. Further, the lower court stated that "[o]ne 
can argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the 
lawsuit that the alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the 
court's interpretation of the language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties 
knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: 
May 7,2001)" Id. at 7. The court further intimated that because of the collateral documents 
presented with DJI's summary judgment memorandum in December of 2002, and the 
arguments made at hearing on August 27, 2003, that Westbrook should have known at that 
time that there might ^e a potential for disqualification. See Memorandum Decision, p. 7. 
As SunCrest acknowledges, a Motion to Disqualify should be brought at the earliest 
moment. Here the lower court found that the earliest moment might have been even at the 
very instigation of litigation in 2001. Or if not then, certainly by December, 2002, when DJI 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Or if not then, certainly by August, 2003 when oral 
arguments were finally heard on DJFs Motion for Summary Judgment. Those were the 
reasons the court based in making a finding of untimeliness. That they happened to file their 
Motion to Disqualify three months after a prior decision was just coincidence. The ruling 
was correct. 
There are issues regarding an interpretation of the agreement which have been known 
since the very beginning of this litigation. If, as SunCrest now claims, Mr. Snuffer was so 
28 
intricately involved with the process of drafting the settlement documents, it was done with 
SunCrest' s attorneys. Mr. Snuffer's involvement, no matter what it actually was, was known 
from the beginning, and this type of motion should have been brought at the beginning. 
Instead, SunCrest has waited until the matter is almost concluded and the parties are 
readying themselves for trial. It is used only as a tactical ploy. 
IV. Judge Davis Properly Balanced the Interests of the Parties. 
Westbrook complains their side was never factored in when the balancing of the 
hardships was accomplished by Judge Davis. Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct stated that a lawyer will not be disqualified where "[disqualification of the lawyer 
would work a substantial hardship on the client." Ut. R. Prof. Conduct. R. 3.7. The 
comment to that rule further requires a balancing between the interests of the client and 
those of the opposing party. Id. To balance the interests the Court must look at whether or 
not the hardship that would occur to the party whose attorney is disqualified outweighs the 
granting of the motion, or vice versa. The exception to the rule is created to avoid 
disqualifying a party representative when that disqualification creates too great a hardship. 
It does not work the other way as suggested by Westbrook. 
The lower court found that to disqualify Snuffer at this stage of the litigation would 
cause substantial hardship to D.J. See Memorandum at p. 5. Additionally the court found 
that it would result in financial and tactical prejudice against D.J. Id. at p. 7. It was this 
hardship that was weighed against the disqualification of Mr. Snuffer. It was done properly 
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and in accordance with the rules of professional conduct. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for SunCrest to argue that it's hardships were not 
considered. The lower court in its decision repeats first that "ca balancing is required 
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party.'" See Memorandum 
Decision, p. 5 (citing Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct, R. 3.7, Comment). Judge Davis 
proceeds then to state that "[t]his Court, after the weighing the [sic] interests of the parties, 
finds that disqualifying Snuffer at this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial 
hardship to D.J." Id. The lower court very clearly indicates it had considered and weighed 
the interests of both parties. Just because SunCrest does not agree with the Court's 
determination, does not mean that it is wrong. It is not an abuse of discretion for the lower 
court to make such a finding, and should not be reversed now. 
V. Will Not Advance the Termination of Litigation. 
Westbrook further argues that this appeal and further litigation over an irrelevant 
issue will advance the termination of litigation. That is false. What they have done is 
instead create new and more delay to litigation. Furthermore, just as the lower court held, 
to change attorneys at this stage in the game would require another attorney and DJI to 
expend an exorbitant amount of time and money, just to get up to speed. This does not 
advance the termination of litigation, it extends it. Westbrook's appeal should be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests this Court affirm the 
decision of the Fourth District Court not to disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. from continuing 
as counsel for Plaintiff and Appellee in this case. 
A 
DATED this c day of October, 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Uenver C. $iufl„ 
Attorney for Appe, 
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ADDENDUM 
NO DOCUMENTS ADDED. 
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Stephen G. Crocket (0766) 
Richard W. Casey (0590) 
Evelyn J. Furse (8952) 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson, 
Greenwood & Casey, PC 
170 South Main St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Appellants in their Reply Brief have alleged that all the citations in Appellee's brief 
are inaccurate. Pursuant to a review of the Opening Brief filed by Appellee, DJ Investments 
has discovered that there are several citations to the record which are incorrect. The purpose 
of this errata is to correct those errors and to clarify the matter for the Court. 
Most of the citations to the record are simply backwards (i.e. R. 2446-2454 instead 
of R. 2454-2446). Those will not be pointed out by this Errata since they do not affect the 
accuracy of the citation. Appellees understand that can be confusing and have supplied a 
second copy of their Opening Brief along with this Errata for the Court's convenience. Only 
the citations have been corrected in the Amended Brief and not the text of the brief. No 
other changes have been made to that brief. 
Upon review of each citation, Appellees have discovered, that by miscount, there are 
several citations that are incorrect. Those are as follows: 
Page 6, last paragraph, citation: (R.2273-5) should read (R. 2222-2220, 2164). 
Page 7, second paragraph, first sentence, citation: (R. 2413) should read (R. 2171). 
Page 7, second paragraph, second sentence, citation: R. 2273-5, should read (R. 
2171-2169). 
Page7, second paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: R. 2223-21, should read (R. 2225-
2223). 
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Page 8, first paragraph, first sentence, citation: R. 2220-18, should read (R. 2222-
2220). 
Page 9, first paragraph, second sentence, citation: R. 2213, should read (R. 2219). 
Page 9, third paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: R. 2220-18, should read (R. 2222-
2220). 
Page 9, third paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: R. 2223-21, should read (R. 2225-
2223). 
Page 10, second paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: R. 2220-18, should read (R. 
2222-2220). 
Page 10, second paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: R. 2223-21, should read (R. 
2225-2223). 
Page 10, second paragraph, fifth sentence, citation: R. 2220-18, should read (R. 2222-
2220). 
Appellants have also complained about references to their Petition For Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order. Though each of the citations refers to documents in the 
record, the record of those pages was not cited. Those record citations are as follows: 
Page 5, fourth paragraph, third sentence, citation: See Deposition of David Mast, p. 
76, In. 1-8, attached as Exhibit 2(B) to Westbrook's Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order, is also found in the record at R. 2172. 
2 
Page 6, first paragraph, fourth sentence, citation: See Deposition of Robert 
Christiansen, p. 25-26, attached as Exhibit 2(C) to Westbrook's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order, is also found in the record at R. 2164. 
Page 8, second full paragraph, second sentence, citation: See Exhibit 2(D) to 
Westbrook's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, Deposition of Jeff 
Anderson, p. 35, is also found in the record at R. 2159. 
Page 9, last paragraph, first sentence, citation: Exhibit 2(E) to Westbrook's Petition 
for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, is also found in the record at R. 2157. 
Page 13, last paragraph, first sentence, citation: See Exhibit 5, p. 6 to Westbrook's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, is also found in the record at R. 2273. 
Page 15, first paragraph, fifth sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 6, 
is also found in the record at R. 2449. 
Page 18, second paragraph, fifth sentence, citation: See Depo of Mr. Mast at p. 76, 
is also found in the record at R. 2172. 
Page 20, first full paragraph, first sentence, citation: page 34 of the attached 
deposition transcript (which was inadvertently not attached) referring to the Deposition of 
Robert Christiansen, attached as Exhibit 2(C) to Westbrook's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order, is also found in the record at R. 2162. 
Page 21, first paragraph, third sentence, citation: See Exhibit 4, attached hereto 
(which was inadvertently not attached), is also found in the record at R. 2219. 
3 
Page 25, third paragraph, second sentence, citation: See Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. And Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & 
Poulsen, page 3, footnote 1, is also found in the record at R. 2214. 
Page 26, third paragraph, first sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 5, 
is also found in the record at R. 2450. 
Page 28, first paragraph, first sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 7, is 
also found in the record at R. 2448. 
Page 28, first paragraph, third sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 7, 
is also found in the record at R. 2448. 
Page 29, last paragraph, first sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 5, is 
also found in the record at R. 2450. 
Page 29, last paragraph, second sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 7, 
is also found in the record at R. 2448. 
Page 30, first full paragraph, first sentence, citation: See Memorandum Decision, p. 
5, is also found in the record at R. 2450. 
Appellee respectfully submits this Errata to correct the citation errors of its Opening 
Brief. 
4 
DATED this 
i r 
day of January, 2005. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing ERRATA 
TO APPELLEE DJ. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C.'S OPENING BRIEF ON 
CERTIORARI, via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Stephen G. Crocket (0766) 
Richard W. Casey (0590) 
Evelyn J. Furse (8952) 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson, Greenwood & Casey, PC 
170 South Main St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
on this Jo day of January, 2005. 
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